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I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 1983, Donald V. Morano stood before the
United States Supreme Court and argued his position in
Dixson v. United States. 2 In his thick New England accent, he
argued that his clients, city officers responsible for the
management and expenditure of federal funds, were not
“public officials” within the definition of a federal bribery
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, which prohibits offering something of
value to a public official with the illicit intent of influencing an
Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of the
Lincoln Memorial University Law Review. The author would like to
thank Assistant Professors Akram Faizer and Melanie Reid for their
substantive knowledge, valuable criticism, and unwavering
encouragement.
2 465 U.S. 482 (1984) (holding that executives of private, nonprofit
corporation having operational responsibility for administration of
federal housing grant program within city under terms of subgrant
from city were “public officials” within meaning of federal bribery
statute, and thus were subject to prosecution under statute).
1
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official act. If his clients were not public officials within the
meaning of the statute, then they could not be convicted under
the statute.
At a superficial glance, a question of this nature would
appear immaterial. The defendants were criminals who
misappropriated funds for an amount of personal gain. Why
care whether federal or state law pursued them? They were
malefactors; they deserved punishment; (seemingly) end of
story. However, a second, more careful look reveals the issue
was not only material, but foundational-- foundational in that
the prosecutorial authority and role of the federal government
was arguably beyond the federal scope, i.e., beyond the role of
the federal government.
Fearing the Court would rule unfavorably in Dixson,
Congress quickly augmented § 201 by passing 18 U.S.C. § 666,
which detailed federal program bribery. Section 666 serves as
a statutory mechanism for the federal prosecution of bribery
and corruption of persons who are not federal employees or
“public officials” under § 201. It is § 666 which draws similar,
arguably more complicated, foundational issues.
The role in and authority of the federal government to
prosecute federal corruption charges levied against state and
local officials has historically been a relatively uncontentious
issue. However, the development of so-called New Federalism
principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in,
most notably, United States v. Lopez 3 and United States v.
Morrison, 4 caused far-reaching stir. The stir’s effect raised the
question of whether § 666, the bribery statute applicable to
state and local officials, was legislated with proper
congressional authority.
Part One of this note will discuss the elements and
jurisprudential evolution of § 201, which criminalizes the
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Gun Free School Zone Act
exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority, since possession of
gun in local school zone was not economic activity that substantially
affected interstate commerce).
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding the Commerce Clause did not provide
Congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), inasmuch as the relevant
provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected
interstate commerce).
3
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bribery of federal officials and the payment or receipt of
official gratuities. Part Two will detail federal program bribery
under § 666, which criminalizes the bribery and corruption of
non-federal employees, including state and local officials. Part
Three will dissect New Federalism and its impact on the
discussion surrounding the federal interest on which
congressional authority to pass § 666 rests. Finally, Part Three,
set against the backdrop of one of Tennessee’s infamous
corruption investigations, Operation Rocky Top, will attempt
to provide a solution to the illusive, missing federal interest in
the prosecution of corrupt state and local officials by adding a
requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional hook. Such a solution
potentially satisfies federalism principles while keeping the
federal anti-corruption statues intact.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF § 201
Due to the supplementary nature of § 666, it is nearly
impossible to meaningfully discuss § 666 without addressing
the statutory section which it supplements, § 201. Section 201
covers two branches of corruption: bribery 5 and illegal
gratuities. 6 Both bribery and illegal gratuities require proof
that (1) with illicit intent, (2) something of value was
requested, offered, or given to a (3) public official, with the
goal of (4) influencing an official act. 7
An act of bribery differs from an illegal gratuity in a
crucial respect, the intent element. Bribery 8 requires quid pro
quo— an official act in exchange for something of value. 9 An
illegal gratuity, on the other hand, requires that the thing of
value be offered or solicited “otherwise than as provided for
the proper discharge of [the federal official’s] official duty[.]” 10
In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 11 the
Court elaborated on this distinction. The Court stated that the
18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).
18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).
7 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2014).
8 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2014) (applicable to the offeror/payor);18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2014) (applicable to the offeree/payee).
9 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).
10 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).
11 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
5
6
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illegal gratuities prohibition, 12 unlike the bribery statute did
not require a connection between the offeror’s intent and the
specific official act. Thus, for the purposes of illegal gratuities,
the intent requirement is satisfied if the offeror sought merely
“to build a reservoir of goodwill” which may be connected to
a future or past unspecified act. 13

A. QUID PRO QUO AND CORRUPT INTENT
Under § 201’s bribery prohibition, the corrupt intent
element is intertwined with the concept of quid pro quo.
Foundationally, in United States v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit
held that “[section 201’s intent element required that] the
government must show the money was knowingly offered to
an official with the intent and expectation that, in exchange for
the money, some act of a public official would be
influenced.” 14 The money must be given with more than
“some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on
the part of the donor.” 15
An adjacent issue is what if the illegal quid pro quo
bargain goes unfulfilled? Under § 201, the offense is complete
when a bribe or gratuity is either offered or solicited. 16 The
bargained for act need not be done to give rise to criminal act.
Additionally, if the offeree never performs the requested
action or has no authority to perform, a criminally briberous
act has nonetheless been committed. 17
As an illustration, in United States v. Valle, the
defendant, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent,
solicited a $20,000 bribe from an immigrant in return for
removing “criminal charges” from the immigrant’s file. 18 The
defendant knew the file contained no criminal charges, and as
a result, he argued that he never intend to follow through.

18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2014) (applicable to the offeror/payor); 18
U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (2014) (applicable to the offeree/payee).
13 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 405.
14 United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980).
15 Id. (citing United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976)).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).
17 United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2008).
18 Id. at 343.
12
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Thus, he argued, he could not be convicted. 19 The court
rejected this argument, citing the Second Circuit case of United
States v. Meyers. 20 In Meyers, 21 a defendant unsuccessfully
asserted the defense that he was “playacting,” i.e., never
intended to commit the act for which the bribe was
exchanged. 22
In response to such reasoning, Judge Weiner offered an
intriguing dissent in Valle. 23 He reasoned that if the offeree has
no legal authority or actual ability to do the official act, then
the offeree could “never have specifically intended to deliver
the quid pro quo required by Sun-Diamond. . . .” 24 Valle is
significant because it is an ideal example of the statutory
interpretative lengths to which courts have gone to expand the
conduct covered under § 201’s umbrella, as evidenced by
Judge Weiner’s well-reasoned specific-intent objection to the
majority’s holding.
Moreover, if § 201 had been ruled inapplicable to the
facts of Valle, it is not as if the defendant would have walked
out the courthouse doors. Under the same facts, the defendant
was convicted of extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872. 25 The
extortion statute, unlike § 201, required no interpretational
gamesmanship to fit the crime.

B. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “OFFICIAL ACT”
Another element of § 201 requires that the briberous
actor seek to influence an “official act.” 26 Generally, courts
have also read the “official act” language broadly to force the
statute fit the crime. 27 In United States v. Biaggi, the court held
that the statute “refers to ‘any’ action taken on a matter
brought before the public official in [the official’s] capacity.” 28
Id.
Id. at 347.
21 United States v. Meyers, 692 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1982).
22 Id. at 831.
23 Valle, 538 F.3d at 350 (5th Cir. 2008) (Weiner, J., dissenting).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 352.
26 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(a).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 97-99 (2nd Cir. 1988).
28 Id. at 98.
19
20
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However, the D.C. Circuit had a different perspective
on the interpretation of “official act.” In Valdes v. United
States, 29 the D.C. Circuit read the “official act” requirement
narrowly. In that case, an officer searched a law enforcement
data base to obtain vehicle registration information in
exchange for cash from an undercover informant. The D.C.
Circuit reasoned that the “officer’s actions” lacked a
sufficiently “formal” relationship to his official duties, and
thus, an official act was not influenced. 30 The court provided a
helpful example:
[A]sking questions (of people, databases, and
real evidence) is certainly a part of
investigating. . . . But it would constitute an
enormous expansion of the gratuities provision
to define “action” on a “matter” as
encompassing every question asked and
answered, or even every question that
somehow parallels those an official might ask
as part of his official duty and whose answer
might entail a use of government resources. It
would bring under the clause a broad range of
moonlighting activities that in any way
paralleled an official's regular work (and
perhaps that of a broad spectrum of fellow
workers, as well). Thus, a Department of Justice
lawyer who used a government Westlaw
account to look up a legal question for a friend
would be, in the dissenters' view, “deci[ding]” a
“question” that might “be brought before
[him].” 31
This D.C. Circuit rationale signaled that the seemingly everexpanding, nearly-boundless scope of federal corruption
statutes must have limits.

C. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES - “THING OF VALUE”

Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Id. at 1342-3.
31 Id. at 1326.
29
30
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Section 201 also requires that the offeror offer, or the
offeree accept, something of value for an official act. The
“thing of value” has been understood to comprise anything
that has a subjective value to the accepting party, the offeree. 32
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams, 33 held that
“corruption of office occurs when the officeholder agrees to
the misuse of his office in the expectation of gain, whether or
not he has correctly assessed the worth of the bribe.” 34

D. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “PUBLIC OFFICIAL” AND
DIXSON V. UNITED STATES
As the final, heavily litigated element, § 201 requires
that the bribe or gratuity be offered, requested, or received by
a “public official” or a “person who has been selected to be a
public official.” 35 This element brings us squarely back to the
Supreme Court chamber in October of 1983 with Donald
Morano. Following opening pleasantries and rehearsed
opening points, the degree to which most Justices were
unconvinced by Morano’s defensive argument was evident
from the tone of their questions and responses to Morano’s
less-than-helpful answers. 36
In the midst of oral argument, Morano’s sympathizers
showed their cards as well. For instance, during the
government’s segment, Justice O’Connor stated, “It is
somewhat of a concern to think that any potential recipient of
federal money might be subject to [§ 201].” 37 The
government’s advocate, Richard G. Wilkins, responded by
stating, “Certainly, it is a matter of some concern, but . . . [§
201] applies only to a person acting for or on behalf of the
See generally 1 SARAH N. WELLING ET AL, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
§ 7.3 (1988).
33 United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1983).
34 Id. at 623.
35 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) & (2) (2014).
36 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez: U.S. Supreme
Court Media, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/19801989/1983/1983_82_5279#sort=vote.
37 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez, at 34:15 (Justice
O’Connor speaking).
32
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United States in an official function, so it isn’t just anyone who
receives some sort of federal fund or some sort of federal
subsidy.” 38
The Court found the government’s answer persuasive
because it echoed similar sentiments in its majority opinion.
The majority held that § 201 was a comprehensive statute
applicable to all persons performing activities for or on behalf
of the United States. 39 Articulating in more detail, the Court
pronounced “the proper inquiry [when determining whether
an individual is a public official] is not simply whether the
person had signed a contract with the United States or agreed
to serve as the Government’s agent, but rather whether the
person occupies a position of public trust with federal
responsibilities.” Thus, in Dixson, despite Congress’s fear it
would rule otherwise, the Court concluded that “[t]he
government has a strong and legitimate interest in prosecuting
[local officials in charge of distributing federal funds] for their
misuse of government funds,” due to the fact that these
officials had the sort of national, public trust Congress
intended to encompass. 40

E. JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S DISSENT IN DIXSON
In Dixson, Justice O’Connor found the majority’s
“public officer or employee with federal responsibilities”
answer to be overly inclusive and vague, and she sought to
provide legal ammunition to those who might challenge the
majority’s broad interpretation of “public official” in the
future. Her dissent, in which an unlikely cast of Justices
Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined, maintained the
position that grantee autonomy, i.e., the independence and
relatively high level of discretion of a state or local grantee
with regard to how federally granted funds are used, should
be determinative. 41 “The main defining characteristic of the
category is the principle of grantee autonomy: although grants
impose conditions on the use of grant funds, grantees are left
38 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, at 34:23 (Richard G.
Wilkins speaking).
39 Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984).
40 Id. at 482.
41 Id. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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considerable discretion to design and execute the federally
assisted programs without federal intrusion.” 42 As a result,
grants-in-aid to state or local governments, managed and
dispersed by their state and local employees or contractors,
should be treated as categorically different from other types of
federal activities. 43 Thus, Justice O’Connor reasoned, § 201 was
not applicable to facts of Dixson. 44
Justice O’Connor expounded on this concept of grantee
autonomy by explaining the principle has particular
importance in two circumstances. First, grantee autonomy is
strongest in “block grant” programs, such as the program at
issue in Dixson. “In such programs, federal control over the
spending of the distributed funds is minimized, and the grant
recipient cannot plausibly be said to be acting for anyone but
itself.” 45 Second, due to longstanding federalism principles,
“the principle of grantee autonomy applies with special force
when federal grant recipients are state or local
governments.” 46 She stated:
Such principles must shape the construction of
the statutory language . . . [And] demand a
strong presumption that state and local
governments are carrying out their own
policies and are acting on their own behalf, not
on behalf of the United States, even when their
programs are being funded by the United
States. 47
In the years that followed Dixson, circuit courts
embraced the “public officer or employee with federal
Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 504 (definition of “grant” requires that “no
substantial involvement is anticipated between the executive agency,
acting for the Federal Government, and the State or local
government or other recipient during performance of the
contemplated activity”)).
43 Dixson, 465 U.S. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 510-11.
45 Id. at 509.
46 Id.(citing See Shapek, MANAGING FEDERALISM: EVOLUTION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRANT-IN-AID SYSTEM (1981)).
47 Dixson, 465 U.S. 509-10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
42
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responsibilities” rationale of the majority and were reluctant to
seize and act on the grantee-autonomy distinction articulated
in Justice O’Connor’s dissent. 48
As a final note, the expansion of § 201’s applicability
widened further in 2001 when a private citizen, who performed
some delegated government function, was held to be a “public
official.” In United States v. Thomas, 49 the Fifth Circuit held that
a prison guard who was employed by a private company,
which contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to run a prison, and who performed the same duties,
had the same responsibilities and potential criminal
culpability as a federal prison guard. 50

III. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - FEDERAL PROGRAM BRIBERY
Congress feared the Supreme Court would rule the
opposite way it did in Dixson, i.e., that the defendants, city
employees in charge of dispersing and managing federal
funds, were not public officials under § 201, so as an
uncharacteristically
preemptive
measure,
Congress
augmented § 201 with § 666 while Dixson was being litigated. 51
This federal program bribery statute is a mechanism by which
the federal prosecution of bribery may be undertaken against
persons who are not federal employees or “public officials.”
Rather than predicate the statutes applicability on federal
employment or public official status, § 666 predicates its
applicability on the receipt of federal “benefits.” 52
The statute makes it a federal criminal offense if (1) an
agent of a state, local government or agency (2) corruptly
solicits or accepts anything of value of $5,000 dollars or more
(3) intending to be influenced in connection with any
transaction the state or local organization for whom the agent
See, e.g., United States v. Strissel, 920 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1990)
(executive director of city housing authority who distributed HUD
funds); United States v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1988)
(county deputy who worked in local jail with contract to house
federal prisoners).
49 240 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2001).
50 Thomas, 240 F.3d at 448.
51 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997).
52 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2014).
48
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works, and (4) such organization receives $10,000 in federal
benefits within a year’s time. 53
The statute met its first major challenge in 1997 when
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer whether
government must prove the bribe at issue, in some way,
affected federal funds before the bribe violated § 666(a)(1)(B).
The case, Salinas v. United States, involved the chief deputy of a
state prison facility. 54 The facility housed several federal
prisoners, and in exchange for housing them, the state facility
received considerable federal funds, and these funds easily
constituted $10,000 in benefits required by § 666. 55 The chief
deputy at the facility received two designer watches and a
truck, which had a value greater than $5,000, in exchange for
allowing a federal prisoner conjugal visits. 56
The defense made a nexus argument which would
require the federal government to prove that the bribery
affected federal funds in order to convict a state or local actor
under § 666. Focusing on the word “any” in § 666(a)(1)(B), the
Court stated the statute broadly encompassed an agent of a
state or local government which receives $10,000 in federal
benefits be influenced or rewarded in connection with any
business, transaction, or series of transactions of the defined
organization, government or agency. 57 As a result, the Court
held that the “expansive and unqualified [language], both as
to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered” does not
support the argument that federal funds must be affected
before the acts could be criminal in nature. 58

A. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
CHALLENGE TONED IN FEDERALISM
The Salinas opinion was equivocal, and as an
aftereffect, a circuit split developed on the issue of whether the
18 U.S.C. § 666(b) & (d)(5) (2014). The statute provides the
applicable punishment, a fine and imprisonment of “not more than
ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2014).
54 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 52.
55 Id. at 54.
56 Id. at 55.
57 Id. at 57.
58 Id. at 52.
53
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criminal acts prohibited by § 666 required any type of nexus
between the corrupt act and a risk to federal funds. To address
this split, the Court heard the case of Sabri v. United States. 59 As
a ramification of the presented nexus issue, congressional
authority to enact § 666 became integral to the proceedings
and decision.
Sabri concerned a member of the Minneapolis
Community Development Agency (“MCDA”) and a real estate
developer. 60 Both were accused of violating § 666(a)(2) when
each was involved in bribes and kickbacks, which exceeded
$5,000, relating to various regulatory approvals and eminent
domain proceedings. 61 Minneapolis received approximately
$29,000,000 per year in federal funds, and the MCDA received
$23,000,000 per year, which easily satisfies the statute’s other
jurisdictional requirement. 62
Sabri raised a facial challenge to the statute when he
argued, “the law can never be applied constitutionally because
it fails to require proof of any connection between a bribe or
kickback and some federal money.” 63 The Court replied that it
“do[es] not presume the unconstitutionality of federal criminal
statutes lacking explicit provision of a jurisdictional hook[,]” 64
the nexus between the corrupt act and federal funds. Further,
the Court expressed, “there is no occasion even to consider the
need for such a requirement where there is no reason to
suspect that enforcement of a criminal statute would extend
beyond a legitimate interest cognizable under Article I, § 8.” 65
The Court further stated:
Congress has authority under the Spending
Clause to appropriate federal moneys to
promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
and it has corresponding authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18,
to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
Id. at 602.
61 Id. 602-3.
62 Id. at 602.
63 Id. at 604.
64 Id. at 605.
65 Id.
59
60
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under that power are in fact spent for the
general welfare, and not frittered away in graft
or on projects undermined when funds are
siphoned off or corrupt public officers are
derelict about demanding value for dollars. 66
After losing the first portion of the Spending Clause
round, the petitioner went into the remainder of the round
wielding Morrison 67 and Lopez. 68 In those cases of similar
rationale, the Court reasoned, it would be necessary “to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.” 69
Thus, the congressional authority to enact such statutes was
not present. In Sabri, however, the Court found that no pile of
inference upon inference was needed. The federal government
was within its “power to keep a watchful eye on expenditures
and on the reliability of those who use public money[.]” 70
In a final effort, the petitioner asserted that the
condition attached to such funds, i.e., that their misuse would
result in criminal culpability, was unduly coercive under the
Tenth Amendment-related test established in South Dakota v.
Dole. 71 If such were held true, then § 666 would be
unconstitutional. However, the Court quickly distinguished
Dole from the facts of Sabri by aptly stating that § 666 brings
“federal power directly to bear on individuals who convert
public spending into unearned private gain,” not on a State’s
public policy decision-making ability, as in Dole. 72
Concurring, 73 Justice Thomas expressed his doubt
about the federal government’s interest his colleagues used to
justify the congressional authority to enact § 666 under the
Id.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
68 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
69 Id. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
70 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608.
71 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
72 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601.
73 Id. at 610 (Justices Kennedy and Scalia also concurred, but only for
the purpose of revoking their indorsement of Part III of the opinion,
which the authoring justices deemed an “afterword”).
66
67
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Spending Clause. He reasoned that merely noting the fungible
nature of money does not explain how the federal government
could gain an interest in all instances of local bribery. Justice
Thomas provided an example: “noting that ‘[m]oney is
fungible,’ . . . for instance, does not explain how there could
be any federal interest in ‘prosecut[ing] a bribe paid to a city's
meat inspector in connection with a substantial transaction
just because the city's parks department had received a federal
grant of $10,000[.]’” 74 Justice Thomas concluded the federal
interest in the bribe at issue in Sabri was comparably
attenuated, “yet the bribe is covered by the expansive
language of § 666(a)(2).” 75

B. THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE SURROUNDING § 666
Sabri was announced in 2003, the same term as
McConnell v. FEC. 76 McConnell held that the federal
government’s interest in combatting corruption outweighs the
ever-important First Amendment rights involved in the
political process. 77 This decision coupled with Sabri,
“confirm[ed] the high priority that the Court places on the
National Government’s authority to fight corruption at any
level in order to protect the democratic process and public
confidence in it.” 78 Accordingly, George D. Brown, Professor
of Law at Boston College Law School, labeled the Court’s 2003
term the “Anti-Corruption Term.” 79
Further, Brown predicted these two cases could be
seen as “two important steps down the road toward more
vigorous anti-corruption efforts.” 80 On a federal level, the
federal government’s concern with the efficiency of its
Id. at 623 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88, 93 (2nd Cir. 1999)).
75 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76 McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),
overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
77 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44, overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
78 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 404 (2005).
79 Id. at 405.
80 Id. at 407.
74
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operations is clear. 81 However, the federal government’s
interest in “sub-national” corruption is significantly more
attenuated. 82 Brown posed, “What concern is to Washington if
Smallville is inefficient, lax on ethical standards, and even
allows their salaries through liberal use of municipal property
and funds?” 83
First, “the conduct of all government officials is
something the public views in unitary terms, regardless of the
level at which it occurs. Thus, corruption at any level can
undermine confidence in the system as a whole.” 84 This
argument is “short on empirical justification” 85 but has an
“intuitive appeal.” 86 In other words, at the time this article was
written, no studies had been conducted much less
conclusively proven that members of the general public were
unable to distinguish between federal, state, and local officials.
Even if such a distinction could not be made in the minds of
average citizens, it is unlikely that such a lack of
understanding or misconception provided a solid basis for
establishing the federal government’s interest necessary for §
666’s legislation.
Second, Brown stated that “interstate externalities”
may be offered as a federal government’s interest. 87
Essentially, corruption in State A may affect State B. This
inference-based justification is “the familiar race to the bottom
argument for national intervention.” 88 Brown dismissed both
of
these
potential
federal
interests
as
“hardly
overwhelming.” 89 Moreover, conceivable federal interests
used to justify federal prosecution of state and local actors
under federal bribery programs “run directly counter to . . .
New Federalism.” 90

Id. at 409.
Id. at 409-10.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 410.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 411.
90 Id.
81
82
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IV. NEW FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL ANTI-CORRUPTION
STATUTES
The late 1990’s and early 2000’s saw, perhaps, the main
thrust of the resurgence of federalism principles. 91 “New
Federalism,” as it was dubbed, is essentially two principles: an
emphasis on the Constitution’s enumeration of federal powers
as limiting the powers of the federal government, 92 and the
concept of states as quasi-sovereign, largely autonomous
entities owed great respect by the co-equal national
government. 93 New Federalism principles are likely the most
controversial Rehnquist Court legacies. 94
One prevailing theme of the Rehnquist Court’s New
Federalism “insiste[d] that it is the task of the Justices to
enforce both textual and structural limitations on federal
power – i.e., that ‘political safeguards are not enough[.]’” 95
Structural federalism is sometimes said by the
Justices not only to facilitate optimal outcomes
through competition and choice, or diversity
and experimentation; the Court's decisions and
reasoning are animated as well by claims that
decisionmakers and regulators ought to be
“accountable” to those they serve, and that this
accountability is enhanced by the dual
sovereignty and decentralization preserved by
our Constitution. 96
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L.
REV. 7, 7 (2001) (“[T]here has been a revolution with regard to the
structure of the American government because of the Supreme Court
decisions in the last few years regarding federalism.”); Lynn Baker,
The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195
(2001).
92 See, e.g., Pritnz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 (1997).
93 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 47, 54, 72, 76 (1996).
94 Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003).
95 Id. at 15 (citing See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001)).
96 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 20 (citing See, e.g., Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
91
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It is from this view of the Constitution’s “text, history,
and structure” 97 that produces the congressional authority
battle played out in the context of federal corruption statutes.
Particularly at issue is the federal government’s power or
authority to enact legislation which reaches state and local
officials.

A. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
TO ENACT § 666: HENNING’S CORRUPTION LEGACY
Peter J. Henning, Professor of Law at Wayne State
University, offered a potential source of congressional
authority to enact § 666 by offering a novel argument that the
Constitution has an “Anti-Corruption Legacy.” 98 Henning
argued that congressional involvement in the prosecution of
state and local official is not a threat to federalism. 99 In fact,
Henning believed federalism is strengthened by federal
prosecution of such crimes because corruption at state and
local levels undermines the balance federalism creates. 100
In support of congressional authority to combat
corruption at the federal level, Henning cited:
“Bribery” as one of the grounds for
impeachment; the prohibition of both change in
the President's compensation during his term of
office and of his receipt of “‘any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of
them”’; the prohibition on federal officeholders'
receipt of emoluments from foreign sources; the
prohibition on members of Congress being
appointed “to any federal office ‘which shall
(“We have addressed the heightened federalism and nondelegation
concerns that agency pre-emption raises by using the presumption to
build a procedural bridge across the political accountability gap
between States and administrative agencies.”)).
97 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 22.
98 Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and
Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 80-2 (2003).
99 Id. at 81-2.
100 Id.
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have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
shall have been encreased during such time’
that the member was in office[; and,] [t]he
Appropriations
Clause
requir[ing]
congressional
authorization
before
[the
executive] can disburse funds.” 101

Taken in conjunction with one another, Henning asserted
these Constitutional provisions are “structural standards
designed to limit the possibility of corruption in the Federal
government.” 102
Regarding Constitutional provisions creating structural
standards applicable to the federal government combatting
corruption at the state level, Henning cites two constitutional
provisions: the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial
and the Article III provision for diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts. 103 Both, in his view, provide a certain level of
protection against corrupt state and local government bias in
judicial proceedings. 104
Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” argument
regarding the federal government’s authority to criminalize
acts of its own employees is unnecessary. The federal
government has a clear interest in and authority to regulate
the acts of its employees which are likely to undermine the
employee’s duties. Thus, Henning likely made those points for
purposes of boosting his Anti-Corruption Legacy argument
relating to the criminalization of acts of state and local
officials.
After close examination, the inferences and logical
backflips needed to find congressional authority to criminalize
and prosecute various acts of state and local officials under
this Anti-Corruption Legacy argument are hardly persuasive
due to their less-than-concrete nature. Such inferences may
frighten a jurist or academician wishing to build a
congressional authority argument on such a basis. George D.
101 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 415-416 (2005)
(citing Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 86-7).
102 Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 87.
103 Id. at 89.
104 Id. at 91.
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Brown agreed that Henning’s an argument is “hardly
dispositive” 105 and he, along with Adam H. Kurland,
discussed another potential source of congressional power to
regulate the conduct at issue, the Guarantee Clause.

B. KURLAND AND THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE
Kurland, Professor of Law at Howard University, a
strong advocate for prosecution on a federal level, wrote that
federal prosecution of state and local officials on the basis of
congressional authority such as the Commerce Clause was
dubious. 106 Thus, Kurland looked elsewhere in the
Constitution for congressional authority. His search led him to
examine the Guarantee Clause. The Guarantee Clause states,
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government[.]” 107 Kurland
believes:
[T]he primary federal interest in combating
local corruption . . . is based on the principle
that the public is entitled to honest government
at all levels. The faith that the citizenry places in
all levels of government is the foundation of the
republic. Thus, anything that erodes that
foundation is of substantial federal interest. The
citizens of the United States are therefore
entitled to federal protection from abuses of
power by those who govern. 108
Further, Kurland saw the Guarantee Clause as akin to
the Fourteenth Amendment in that he views it as “a
constitutional provision that necessarily intrudes on state

Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 417.
Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 486
(1989).
107 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
108 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 418 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. at 376-77).
105
106
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sovereignty and alters the normal federal state balance.” 109
Additionally, Kurland believed the Guarantee Clause could be
a source of congressional power to enact a generally applicable
anti-corruption statute. 110
The immediate benefit of his thesis is that it is a
plausible basis for “dealing directly with the problem of the
prosecutions: validation under a general statute, of those
prosecutions.” 111 However, Congress has never taken such a
broad view of its power. 112 More importantly, recent Supreme
Court discussion of the Guarantee Clause seems to view the
clause more “as a source of state autonomy than a font of
federal power.” 113 Thus, New Federalism, discussed
previously, blocks the Guarantee Clause from being a source a
federal power, at least as it is currently viewed.

V. OPERATION ROCKY TOP - AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY
& RESTRICTING § 666’S SCOPE BY ADDING A
JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
A. OPERATION ROCKY TOP
By 1985, fearing circumvention of Tennessee’s strict
gambling prohibitions, the Tennessee General Assembly
began to heavily regulate charitable bingo operations, which
were generating an estimated $31 million a year. 114 For
instance, the legislature began limiting the times a person
could play within a specified time period and the types of
Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 419 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. at 459).
110 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. at 452-53).
111 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420.
112 Id. (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. at 493).
113 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-9
(listing the Guarantee Clause among provisions that reflect the
Constitution's commitment to state sovereignty)).
114 Interview with Tennessee State Senator Randy McNally,
Chairman of the Finance, Ways, & Means Committee, in Oak Ridge,
TN. (Mar. 21, 2015); Ronald Smothers, Tennessee Republicans See an
Election Weapon in State’s Bingo Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, January 28, 1990,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/28/us/tennesseerepublicans-see-an-election-weapon-in-state-s-bingo-scandal.html.
109
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prizes which could be won. 115 During this time, the Secretary
of State’s office oversaw compliance with the relevant bingo
law and regulations. 116
In the fall of 1985, then-state Representative James R.
“Randy” McNally (“McNally”), who represented a portion of
East Tennessee, received a call from a member of the local
chapter of the Fraternal Order of Eagles (“Eagles”), an
organization geared toward health-related charitable efforts, 117
and the member told McNally of concerns he had with the
bingo practices of a local branch of the Army & Navy Union
(“Army-Navy”), 118 an armed services veteran’s social
organization. The Eagles member explained that Army-Navy
was not adhering to Tennessee law in various ways. 119
Consequentially, McNally began to investigate the law and
Army-Navy. 120
Simultaneous to investigating the matter, McNally
contacted Secretary of State’s office, and expressed his
concerns about the practices of the Army-Navy branch, and he
asked the office to look into Army-Navy’s practices. 121 By
February of 1986, McNally said he was frustrated because his
efforts to prompt the Secretary of State to investigate “were
going nowhere.” 122 At approximately the same time, McNally
received a call from three fellow House members, and one in
particular asked McNally to meet with a Bingo Association
lobbyist. Initially, McNally was reluctant; however, as a
courtesy, he consented.123
115 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally (Mar. 21, 2015)
(on file with author).
116 Gentry Crowell, 57; Top Tennessee Aide, N.Y. TIMES, December 22,
1989, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/22/obituaries/gentry-crowell57-top-tennessee-aide.html.
117 Fraternal Order of Eagles, About,
http://www.foe.com/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
118 Army and Navy Union, Home,
http://www.armyandnavyunion.org/home/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2015).
119 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally, supra note 115.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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At the end of the same legislative work week, McNally
met with the lobbyist at the Hermitage for a luncheon to
discuss bingo practices. 124 McNally explained that “the
meeting went normally until the [lobbyist] said some of the
legislators that [the lobbyist] dealt with liked to get their
money during campaign season, and others liked the money
to be spread out over the year.” 125 McNally found the
statement deeply unsettling. 126 What type of money was the
lobbyist talking about-- campaign contributions or something
else? Even if he were only referencing legal campaign
contributions, why would the legislators prefer the funds be
“spread out” over the year?
He considered the statement over the weekend, and
returned to Nashville the proceeding Monday but was unsure
how to proceed. 127 He worried about being framed as an
“alarmist.” 128 As a Rotary Club member, McNally attended a
Rotary meeting that Monday, and the civic-driven message
conveyed by the meeting, pushed him to delve deeper into the
lobbyist’s statement, regardless of the potential political and
social ramifications. 129 He called the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“F.B.I.”). 130
A call screener at the F.B.I.’s Nashville office answered
the phone, obtained the necessary information, and told
McNally he would be contacted soon. 131 Within five minutes,
they called back. 132 F.B.I. agent, Richard Knudsen, expressed
that the F.B.I. was interested in McNally’s information. 133
Additionally, McNally learned that Knudsen had been
working in conjunction with an agent of the Tennessee Bureau
of Investigation (“T.B.I.”), Roger Farley, on this matter. 134

Id.
Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
124
125
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McNally was instructed not to initiate conversations
with the Bingo Association’s lobbyist. 135 McNally said, “if [he]
called, I was supposed to tell them, ‘I was ok; I was satisfied’
with the legality of their operation.” 136 Approximately two
weeks after the Hermitage luncheon, another player revealed
himself.137
W.D. “Donnie” Walker (“Walker”), head of the
Charitable Solicitations division of the Secretary of State’s
office, contacted McNally, and ominously asked, “everything
ok?” 138 McNally gave an affirmative response, but the
interested parties must not have been convinced because a
week later, while McNally was on his way to a committee
meeting in the General Assembly’s main office building, the
War Memorial Building, the Bingo Association’s lobbyist
handed McNally a white envelope, and said, “we appreciate
you.” 139
As a result, he was immediately faced with a crucial
decision: whether to risk raising alarm by skipping the
committee meeting and reporting the event, or go to the
meeting with an envelope filled with unknown content in his
coat jacket’s side pocket. 140 After a brief moment of
consideration, McNally called Agents Knudsen and Farley. 141
The agents told McNally to leave the immense, yet crowded,
office building without being seen, and they would pick him
up immediately. 142
After stopping at nearby fast-food restaurant, the
agents took the envelope from McNally, examined it, and
preserved it as evidence. 143 Upon opening the envelope,
McNally found three hundred dollars. 144 At the direction of
the agents, McNally made a recorded phone call to the

Id.
Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
135
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lobbyist. 145 McNally thanked him for the money and expressly
asked whether it should reported as a campaign
contribution. 146 The lobbyist said they did not intent to report
it, and neither should he. 147
A lull in the relevant events occurred until June of 1986
when the “drop dead” contribution reporting date
approached. 148 McNally was concerned about whether to
report the three-hundred dollars because the Secretary of State
oversaw the reporting and recording of contributions. 149 The
F.B.I. was proceeding with a particular degree of caution
because Abscam, a corruption investigation ending with the
overturning of several charges due to entrapment issues, was
a not-so-distant memory. 150 The F.B.I. and T.B.I. wanted more
evidence, so when the lobbyist in question came calling, they
sent McNally to meet with him in July of 1986. 151
Prior to the meeting, set to take place at the Regas in
Knoxville, McNally was fitted with a wire and transmitting
device. He was “sweating bullets” during the dinner. 152 The
conversation centered around lobbying and the Army-Navy
matter. 153 The lobbyist explained that he knew “how the
[legislative] game was played.” 154 With McNally (and
investigating officials) listening, he proceeded to tell McNally
that the game is best played when a lobbyist can get close to a
legislator, obtain money for the legislator to vote a certain way
on a hotly-contested bill, and the legislator and lobbyist split
the corresponding illegal funds. 155 To the investigators’ and
McNally’s deeper surprise, the lobbyist cited specific votes
and members the lobbyist had helped influence. 156
The dinner had gone on quite some time when
suddenly McNally heard the previously set codeword over the
Id.
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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Regas’s intercom system. 157 He quickly excused himself, and
met with agents in the men’s bathroom. 158 Apparently, the
tape recorder he was wearing was nearly out of recording
capacity, and McNally was forced to end the dinner quickly
without raising suspicion. 159 McNally returned to the table,
and the dinner ended anti-climatically with no further
material facts developing, and to much disappointment, no
money was exchanged. 160
Tapes in hand, the F.B.I. brought the case before
Washington officials. 161 After reviewing the tapes, the
investigation received high priority, i.e., reinforcements were
deployed. 162 Most notably, the F.B.I. sent an undercover agent
to pose as a lobbyist. 163
In September of 1986, another major effort to gather
evidence occurred. 164 The lobbyist, Walker, and McNally met
in the parking lot of an East Tennessee hospital. 165 With the
F.B.I. and T.B.I. watching, McNally received one-thousand
dollars after feigning dissatisfaction with the prior bribe. 166
Serendipitously, reports of a peeping Tom had been made to
the local police, and the entire surveillance of the event was
almost exposed when a local police unit rolled by and saw the
surveillance van. 167
Thinking the van may be connected to the peeping
Tom reports, the local police officer got out, and began asking
questions of the T.B.I. and F.B.I. agents within. 168 Quickly, the
agents identified themselves, and asked the officer to leave. 169
Meanwhile, McNally calmed the lobbyist and Walker, who
had seen the local police unit, by telling them to “just be
Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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cool.” 170 When the officer left, the parties went their separate
ways. 171
In November of 1986, McNally was elected to the
Tennessee Senate. 172 Nearly three years later, the investigation
was publicly announced by the F.B.I. and T.B.I. 173 Many and
varying federal indictments were issued as result of the
information gathered as a result of the information collected
by F.B.I, the T.B.I., and McNally. 174 Particularly, the lobbyist
and Walker were offered plea deals in return for
cooperation. 175 Both initially rejected. 176 However, the ‘big
break” in the case occurred when Walker became a witness for
the prosecution. 177 “Mr. Walker . . . pleaded guilty in a plea
agreement and provided details of how he helped operators
obtain fraudulent charters as charities so that they could
legally organize bingo games.” 178
Walker detailed that he arranged “secret partnerships”
in the operations for some current and former elected officials,
and he helped organize the bingo operators into a group
called ''the Association,'' whose goal was funneling money to
legislators willing to become a part of a secret partnership. 179
“Armed with Mr. Walker's testimony, grand juries began their
indictments. Among those indicted were a former member of
the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, a labor leader, a former
legislator, and State Election Commissioner and an incumbent
legislator[,]” 180 as well as the previously discussed defendants.
Operation Rocky Top reached its highest political actor
with Secretary of State. After testifying before the federal
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177 Ronald Smothers, Tennessee Republicans See an Election Weapon in
State’s Bingo Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
January 28, 1990, available at
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grand jury, the Secretary was called another time. 181 Knowing
that the recall was likely to end in his indictment, he
committed suicide. 182 In response to the revelations of the
investigation, the Tennessee General Assembly established
new, more rigid ethical boundaries: limits on campaign
contributions and new lobbying restrictions. 183 However,
perhaps federal intervention was unnecessary.

B. AN ADDITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
The rationale used by the Court to support
congressional authority to pass § 666 is arguably
unconvincing. The highly policed Commerce Clause provided
no basis; the Taxing and Spending rationale of Salinas and
Sabri is wanting; Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” begged
for serious inferences, and the Guarantee Clause provided no
help in the face of the resurgence of Federalism principles, i.e.,
New Federalism.
If, as a counterfactual, § 666 were found to have been
without congressional authority and Senator McNally had
accepted the bribes offered, the F.B.I.’s lack of power to
investigate the matter would not cause the sky to fall on the
heads of the people of the State of Tennessee. The State, a
quasi-sovereign federalism partner, would address the matter
from an investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicative role.
Specifically, the T.B.I.’s white collar division would
investigate, seek to prosecute, and have the matter of public
corruption adjudicated.
At the heart of federal corruption statutes is the lack of
trust the federal government has in states to discover,
investigate, and fairly adjudicate a matter of corruption which
involves the state’s local and/or state-level officials. The
federal assumption essentially is that a state from which
corruption spawns is thereby ill-equipped to help itself, to

181 Tennessee Secretary of State Dies after Suicide Attempt, DAILY NEWS,
Bowling Green, Kentucky , Page 4-A, December 21, 1989, available at
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1696&dat=19891221&id
=9PMaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=kkcEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7052,6125595&hl=en.
182 Id.
183 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally, supra note 115.
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address the matter. This assumption is a fallacy of the worst
order. It is a generalization.
All states in which corruption exists are not necessarily
unable to address the matter merely because a corrupt act
germinated within its boundaries. A determination as to
whether the state is capable of addressing the matter must be
made with regard to the nature and extent of the corrupt
activities at issue. If the corrupt activities are so pervasive as to
call reasonable doubt as to whether the state agency or branch
of government in charge of investigating, prosecuting, or
adjudicating the matter can fairly handle the matter then,
perhaps, federal intervention is needed. Otherwise, the state
should be allowed to address the matter with its agents and
under its criminal law.
To effectuate this policy, § 666’s jurisdictional hook
need only be amended. The jurisdictional hook currently
requires, an agent of a State, local government or agency to
corruptly solicit or accept anything of value of $5,000 or more,
and such organization of which that agent is a part receive
$10,000 in federal benefits within a year’s time. 184 It should be
amended to additionally require that “there be reasonable
belief that the state agency or agencies with jurisdiction to
investigate, prosecute, or adjudicate the alleged corrupt matter
will be unable to fairly decide whether to proceed with the
matter due to potential bias, political or otherwise, created by
the pervasive nature of the corruption scheme at issue.”
This additional requirement would, in effect, remedy
the generalization fallacy at the heart of § 666 as well as curb
the nearly boundless scope of the statute. The concern
regarding the lack of significant, traceable federal interest
articulated by Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Sabri would
also be quieted because the federal government could
articulate reasonable doubt as to the ability of the state to
handle the state or local matter, and thereby gain an interest in
legislating and enforcing § 666.
Take Justice Thomas’s city meat inspector example.
Recalling his concurrence in Sabri, Justice Thomas was
unpersuaded by the argument that the fungible nature of
money gave rise to a federal interest in prosecuting a bribe
paid to a city's meat inspector in connection with a substantial
184
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transaction just because the city's parks department had
received a federal grant of $10,000. 185 The additional
jurisdictional requirement as to the ability of the state to
handle the matter of the unsavory meat inspector would add
significant weight to the federal government’s interest that
Justice Thomas felt unconvincingly light (or non-existent).
To have palpable impact, the suggested additional
jurisdictional requirement would necessarily have to be one
which is proven to the jury at the time of trial. From an
evidentiary perspective, for the federal government to able to
proceed with the prosecution of the meat inspector, they
would be required to produce evidence showing that the state
would be unable to fairly decide whether to further investigate
and potentially prosecute because, to extend facts of the
example, the meat inspector’s unscrupulous behavior was
merely a small tributary of a much larger, pervasive
corruption scheme—a scheme which reasonably could leave a
state-led investigation without the ability to fairly decide
whether to proceed.
Specifically, the federal government would be required
to produce evidence showing that the local or state regulatory
agency in charge of the meat inspector’s compliance with
applicable law was tainted by the corruption scheme. Ideally,
the federal government would produce evidence, such as
video recordings, financial statements, or collaborative
testimony, which demonstrates further bribes or a portion of
the briberous scheme reached the highest overseeing local and
state actors as to render those actors without the ability, due to
their involvement, to execute their investigative duties.
In the context of Operation Rocky Top, if McNally had
taken a $5000 bribe, § 666 would be applicable because the
State of Tennessee receives far more than $10,000 in federal
benefits in a year’s time, and the bribe would have been in
connection with his capacity as a legislator. Should the
additional jurisdictional element suggested have existed then,
the federal prosecutor would have had to demonstrate to the
jury that the T.B.I., the state prosecutorial authority, or state
adjudicating body was unable to fairly decide whether to
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proceed with the matter due its bias, political or otherwise,
created by the pervasive nature of the corruption scheme.
Ideally, the prosecutor would present lawfully
obtained testimony, recordings, or official or business records
which would show that the bingo-related illegal funds or
political influence spread from the legislature and into the
relevant investigatory department of the T.B.I., the
prosecuting official, or adjudicative body as to taint a link in
the state’s criminal justice process.
Specifically, the new element could have been satisfied
by a prosecutorial showing of the scheme’s taint reaching the
relevant, white-collar arm of the T.B.I. or the local judicial
official who would likely hear the case if filed. Such a showing
would demonstrate a reasonable belief that the pervasive
nature of the corruption scheme at issue destroyed the
objective stance of state agency tasked with the investigation,
prosecution, or adjudication of the Association’s bingo-related
practices. A taint of this nature would, in effect, render the
state’s justice process unable to properly address the
corruption matter. Upon that evidentiary showing, then
federal interdiction into a state or local corruption matter
would be proper.
However, the facts of investigation fell short of this
jurisdictional requirement due to the fact that no evidence was
presented that the corruption scheme reached into the T.B.I. or
the state court system which would have adjudicated the
matter. Had these been contemporary events and had the
additional jurisdictional hook been in place, the State of
Tennessee’s semi-autonomous nature would have been
respected and left undisturbed by federal intervention.

VI. CONCLUSION
Since Dixson, courts have seen the scope of § 201
become nearly boundless, and cases limiting its scope have
had a nominal effect. 186 By preemptively passing § 666,
Congress further augmented the scope federal corruption
crimes. After discussing various potential sources of
congressional authority, the unconvincing Spending Clause
See, e.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en
banc).
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rationale was revealed. Startlingly, the Court stated that the
federal interest required for congressional authority to pass §
666 stemmed from the fact that $10,000 in federal funds were
merely in the vicinity of corruption. In the face of New
Federalism, such logic, such a tenuous articulation of federal
interest cannot stand. However, a solution was presented.
The additional requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional
hook, i.e., the federal government would be required to
forbear intervention into what could largely be qualified as an
intra-state matter unless the federal government could
demonstrate the state’s inability to help itself, would
significantly lessen the tenuous nature of the federal interest as
well as satisfy New Federalism principles, at least from a
theoretical perspective.
To demonstrate the jurisdictional requirement’s
pragmatic efficacy, Operation Rocky Top, a Tennessee
corruption investigation, served as case study in which
examples of how such a requirement could be met with a
sufficient evidentiary showing. In short, the requirement
would place a duly heavy burden on a federal prosecutor
pursuing a § 666 action against a state actor, but that is
precisely the point. Such a heavy burden is necessary to give
the federal government its required interest in the criminal
matter and comport with New Federalism principles. The
additional jurisdictional requirement reins federal authority,
and by predicating federal authority on a respect for a state’s
semi-autonomous nature, the federal government is placed in
an on-deck posture.

